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ness or other obligation owed by the drawer to the agency, there
was no intent to confer a proprietary interest in the agency. The
bank did in fact intend that the check be used for a specific pur-
pose, but the existence of such a condition could not effect the
rights of an innocent third party.2" When the agency refused to ac-
cept the check, the endorsement to the agency no longer had any
legal signifiance.6 3 Hence, there was no basis for an assertion of
forgery, since an unauthorized signature is significant only if
the person seeking to enforce payment has acquired title "through
or under such signature." 64
The court then found that having the power to negotiate, the
payees had in fact done so. After the agency refused to accept
the check, the payees elected to treat the endorsement as "fictiti-
ous" and thus transformed the instrument into bearer paper 05
The court noted that while this is known as the "fictitious payee
doctrine" it applies as well to indorsees. The only operative fac-
tor is the intent of the indorser or drawer,66 and since he could
easily have made the check payable "to bearer," the law regards
him as having done so.
The case may well be regarded as a caveat to those who issue
negotiable paper to choose carefully the form in which that paper
is issued. If, as the court pointed out, the car agency had been
made the payee, either the limited purpose for which the check was
issued would have been fulfilled or the attempted further negotia-
tion of the check could have been effected by a signature of the
agency that would, in such circumstances, be a forgery.
V. CRIMInAL LAW
Statutes
a. Purview of Vagrancy Statute: Some broad language in
the New York vagrancy statute' centered the attention of the Court
of Appeals in People v. Gould,2 wherein defendant was convicted
under that statute, having suggested in vain to a policewoman in
62. Supra, note 58.
63. Id. § 78; McNeill v. Shellito, 185 App. Div. 857, 173 N. Y. Supp. 810 (1st
Dep't 1919).
64. Supra, note 59; Britton, Bills and Notes, 697 (1943).
65. Negotiable Instruments Law § 28 (3).
66. Phillip v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 140 N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982 (1894) ; Cohen v.
Lincoln Say. Bank of Brooklyn, 250 App. Div. 702, 274 N. Y. Supp. 488 (1st Dept 1937),
aff'd 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E. 2d 457 (1937).
1. CODE CRm. Paoc. § 887 (4) (b) defines a vagrant as "A person . . . who offers
or offers to secure another for the purpose of prostitution, or for any other lewd or inde-
cent act . . .."
2. 306 N. Y. 352, 118 N. E. 2d 553 (1954).
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disguise that she become a prostitute under his management. The
majority opinion of the court, by Judge Desmond, although de-
ploring the lubricity of defendant's conduct, reversed the convic-
tion and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the defendant,
futile in his meretricious endeavors, had not conducted himself in
such a manner as to come within the purview of the statute defining
vagrants. More must be shown than mere tentative steps toward
an entrance into such illicit enterprise before proof of conviction,
even under the broad language of the vagrancy statute, may be
had.3
A persuasive dissenting opinion by Judge 'donway, in which
Chief Judge Lewis and Judge Froessel concurred, pointed out that
sexual immorality conceived of as a form of vagrancy is peculiar
to quite recent statutory law, and that it was not until subdivision
4 of Section 887 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted in
1915 that specific acts related to prostitution were subsumed under
the criminal category of vagrancy.' A comparison of clause (b) of
subdivision 4 as originally enacted with its state as amended in
1919' evidences an indication of legislative intent to broaden the
scope of the statutory definition of "vagrants", not circumscribe
it. The insertion of the amendatory word "another", and the
broad implication of the word "person" were thought by the dis-
sent to be so all-embracing as to prevent an exclusion therefrom of
an unsuccessful attempt. Upon this analysis, it appears that the
conclusion by the majority to the effect that an unsuccessful pand-
erer is no panderer at all is questionable.8
b. Constitutionality of loitering statute: The constitution-
ality of the New York loitering statute7 was questioned before the
Court of Appeals in People v. Bell et al.,' where defendant's con-
viction of loitering in a railroad station was reversed by County
Court,9 which reversal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
Court affirmed not on the ground that the statute was unconstitu-
3. Ibid.
4. CODE Crlnu. Paoc. §887 (4), L. 1915, c. 285, § 1 (1915).
5. Before the amendment, the statute limited the definition of vagrancy to one who
offered a female person or offered to secure a female person for the commission of
prostitution. The subdivision after amendment, however, deleted the words "female per-
son" and substituted "another" therefor. L. 1919, c. 502, § 1. That the legislature has
power to define terms used in its enactments, see Matter of Bronson's Estate, 150 N. Y. 1,
44 N. E. 707 (1896) ; McK. STATUTEs § 75.
6. That it is not necessary it be shown that defendant was habitually engaged in
this or like conduct, see People v. Vantides, 284 N. Y. 731, 31 N. E. 2d 201 (1940).
7. PENAL LAW § 1990-a (2) provides: "Any person who loiters about any toilet,
station or station platform of a subway or elevated railway or of a railroad, or who is
found sleeping therein or thereon and who is unable to give satisfactory explanation of his
presence is guilty of an offense."
8. 306 N. Y. 110, 115 N. E. 2d 821 (1953).
9. 204 Misc. 117, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 117 (County Ct. ,1953).
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tional for reasons of vagueness and indefiniteness, but that the evi-
dence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.
The question concerning the constitutionality of the statute
arose from the last phrase " . . . and who is unable to give sat-
isfactory explanation of his presence is guilty of an offense." The
phrase was attacked on the ground that the wording was so vague
and indefinite that it did not sufficiently indicate a standard which
could be known in advance. Noting, however, the construction
policy that language ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of sus-
taining the presumptive constitutionality of statutes,10 if such con-
struction can be fairly deduced from the'perceptible legislative in-
tent supporting its enactment and inherent within its provisions,11
as well as the contextual effect on the quality of the phrase as con-
trasted with its state isolated from the general structure,12 the
court concluded that the words in question merely outlined a
method of procedure for purposes of ascertaining whether a viola-
tion had occurred, and hence did not invalidate the statute. It was
held, however, that the evidence adduced was insufficient to sustain
the conviction in that the arresting officer did not pursue his in-
quiry to the extent of excluding the possibility that defendants
remained on the premises for some legitimate purpose as implied
invitees or licensees.
In a concurring opinion by Judge Desmond, joined in by Judge
Fuld, it was stated that affirmance of the court below should be
based on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the statute in
that the ambiguous wording in question was an essential part of
the criminal statute which could not be deleted therefrom, 8 and
which does not provide a clearly indicated standard of conduct
sufficient to constitutionality.14
c. Double parkinq defined: A very narrow question per-
taining to the interpretation and application of a section of the
Traffic Regulations of the City of New York, relating to double
parking, was presented to the Court of Appeals in People v. Ressa-
10. Devoy v. Craiq. 231 N. Y. 186, 131 N. E. 884 (1921); Stubbe v. Adamson, 220
N. Y. 459. 116 N. E. 372 (1917) ; cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Durkin, 301 N. Y. 376,
93 N. E. 2d 897 (1950).
11. See People ex rel. Parker Mills v. Commissioners of Taxes of City of N. Y.,
23 N. Y. 242, 244 (1861).
12. See People v. Richards. 108 N. Y. 137, 15 N. E. 371 (1888); People v. Lam-
phere, 219 App. Div. 422, 219 N. Y. Supp. 390 (4th Dep't 1927).
13. See. e. g., People v. Teal, 196 N. Y. 372, 378, 89 N. E. 1086, 1088 (1909);
People ex el. Collins v. McLaughlin, 60 Misc. 306, 308, 113 N. Y. Supp. 306, 307 (Sup.
Ct. 1908).
14. See. e. a., Winters v. People of the State of New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948);
People v. Adamkieiecz, 298 N. Y. 176, 179, 81 N. E. 2d 76, 77 (1948).
15. 306 N. Y. 267, 117 N. E. 2d 547 (1954).
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Defendant concededly parked his Mack truck on the roadway
side of another automobile for the purpose of unloading merchan-
dise in the course of a delivery. There was no charge of traffic
obstruction, but only that of a double parking violation.16 The
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that an
hrticle of the Traffic Regulations entitled "Definitions" excludes
vehicles "when actually or expeditiously engaged in loading or un-
loading merchandise'" from the applicable purview of the word
"park." Since the contextual reading of the word, as "double'
park," does not require an inclusion of a vehicle stopped or stand-
ing, even though loading or unloading merchandise, and the phrase
"double parking" appears only parenthetically in the article, the
modifier "double" in no way changes the definitive meaning of the
word "park"; and since defendant was not "parked" within the
meaning of the Regulations, he was not "double parked".
A dissenting opinion by Chief Judge Lewis, concurred in by
Judge Desmond and Judge Dye, expressed the view that the word
"double" changed the word it modified, "park", and therefore
the defendant was not excluded by the definition exception, section
1 (17) (a).
Amendment of Information
It has been a firm rule that an amendment to an indictment
which supplies an omission altering the substance and not merely
the form thereof is improper.'8 The reason which bases such a
rule is'that an indictment requires the action and intervention of
a grand jury, and therefore an amendment thereto which affects
its substantial character would amount to a usurpation of a func-
tion of the grand jury by the court."9 An information, however,
which does not require the action of a grand jury or any particular
agency or body has been held to be the proper subject of amend-
ment, even though such amendment goes to the substance of the
charge.20
16. TRAFFIC REGULATIONS OF CITY OF NEW YOfK, Art. 2, § 10 (o).
17. Id. Art. 1, § 1 (17) (a) provides that park, parking or parked means the stop-
ping or standing of a vehicle, occupied or not, except "when actually and expeditiously
engaged in loading or unloading merchandise!' The article indicates that the definitions
it sets forth are applicable to terms in the Regulations, "unless the context or subject
matter otherwise requires."
18. People v. Van Every, 222 N. Y. 74, 78, 118 N. E. 244, 245 (1917) ; see CODE
CRrm. PRoc. §§ 280, 284 (5).
19. E. g., People v. Bronuich, 200 N. Y. 385, 93 N. E. 933 (1911); People v.
Geyer, 196 N. Y. 364, 90 N. E. 48 (1909). See also CODE Came. PROC. § 293 which pro-
vides that a court may amend an indictment to conform with the proof in respect to time
. . . if the defendant cannot be thereby prejudiced in his defense on the merits.
20. See, e. g., State v. Pritchard, 35 Conn. 319, 326 (1868) ; State v. Jensen, 83 Utah
452, 454-455, 30 P. 2d 203, 204 (1934) ; State v. Barrell, 75 Vt. 202, 204, 54 A. 183 (1903) ;
see also I WrARTO N, CRrmINAL PRocEauRE §§ 128, 132 (10th ed. 1918) ; see Ex Parte
Bain, 121 U. S. 1, 6 (1887).
